Omar Vizquel has a .725 Career OPSsc masquerading as a .688 OPS, and it may cost him a chance to be voted into the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame.

**An OPSsc (speed contact) stat** would allow the speed contact hitters to have their own version of OPS. **OPSsc** would also show how much closer a speed contact hitter is to a slow footed Power hitter when speed and contact is credited on productive outs.

I am going to list all aspects of OPS statistics that need to be re examined and adjusted going as far back as MLB stats can allow.

**1. **__Multiple Sacrifices in an at bat.__ If a batter moves three runners over with a productive out, they should get credit for 3 sacrifices, not one.

**2. **__If a batter moves two runners over,__ they should get credit for two sacrifices, not one.

**3. **__If a batter tries to get a hit the opposite way with the intent of also moving the runner over a base,__ the batter should be given credit for a sacrifice.

**4. **__If a batter moves two runners over while trying to get an opposite field hit,__ the batter should get credit for 2 sacrifices.

**5. **__A deep fly ball that scores a run should automatically be ruled a sacrifice,__ even if the runner was trying for a hit.

6. __A fly ball that advances three__ runners should be credited as 3 sacrifices.

7. __A fly ball that advances two runners__ should be credited as 2 sacrifices.

**8. **__Speed causes errors.__ A high percentage of a batters safe by way of an error plays are caused because of the batter's speed. The idea that a slow footed baserunner could shuffle to first so slowly that a ball that is bobbled and bounces away from a third baseman a few feet, yet the third baseman can retrieve the ball and throw the runner out at first, __is treated statistically identical__ to a fast runner who beats out a grounder that is barely bobbled and caught before it touches the ground and is fired to first base, is beyond comprehension. Speed induced errors should be credited as getting on base, even if it is not counted as hit, it should be counted as a walk or something that is credited towards the On Base Percentage.

**9. ****GIDPs should result in a SUBTRACTION of some amount** since before the batter batted there was an extra runner on base. Power hitters hit into more double plays than speed contact hitters and are not penalized in any way.

**10. ****A comparison between a fast runner on first base and a slower runner on first base should be considered.** Besides stolen base percentage, does the next batter see more fastballs or a more predictable pitch selection because a fast runner is on first base? Is the open space between first and second, or shortstop and second base wider when a fast runner is on base because the interior defensemen have to shade closer to the second base bag in case of a stolen base attempt? Does the first baseman hold at first base longer for a speed threat on first versus a non stealing threat?

**None of these ten scenarios by themselves constitute much of a difference. It's when we combine and define all ten that suddenly we might see a noticeable increase in OPSsc for the faster contact runners and a slight decrease in OPSsc for slower runners.**

Sacrifices need to have some type of value attributed to them. The argument that a runner on first base with no outs scores more often than a runner on second base with one out is a stat that has not been fully analyzed. There may be a 5% differential edge to a runner on first base and no outs versus a runner on second base and one out, but the overall statistical advantage differential may manifest itself moreso because of a high scoring one sided game versus a low scoring, close game. While big innings are more likely to occur by not bunting, A big inning in a 13-4 victory creates a false narrative when it is bundled into the total runs scored stat when comparing overall runs scored from first with no outs versus from second with one out.

**Moving a runner over is always better than a non productive out, and productive outs should be a part of OPSsc. If a batter can hit .272 AND have a significant amount of productive outs, then lets not bury the player as being a weakstick just because he did not hit a lot of home runs.**

How do we determine how much a sacrifice is "worth"? Clearly one or two sacrifices is not worth a hit. I would suggest that five sacrifices is the equivalent of a single. I think that is a very generous estimate. An argument could be made that 4 or 4.5 sacrifices equal a hit, but to play it conservative, I will say 5 sacrifices equals one hit. It means a batter moved runners over five times while making an out, and in some scenarios could have moved over multiple runners with just one out. Anytime a runner moves just one base, it means the runner is now in scoring position or has scored. So creating five scoring chances via a sacrifice that will then only require a single for the runner to score seems an overly fair exchange when valuing moving one runner over. I think an argument could be made that four sacrifices is equivalent to either a single, or the equivalent of a walk for OBP purposes when calculating OPS or OPSsc.

If we add OPSsc value of 1/5th of a hit for every time a batter moves any runner over a base, over the course of a season we could be seeing a batter being credited for an extra 30/5 productive outs, or the equivalent of 6 hits. Six hits can add 15 points to a batting average. If we estimate 3 speed induced errors as being like a walk, that adds another 7 1/2 points to the OPSsc. If we subtract GIDP/OBP from the power hitters (using 20 GIDP in a season as their average while speed hitters would be around 10) their OPSsc would drop around 12 to 25 points. Suddenly we are looking at 22.5 plus for the Speed Contact hitters and a minus of around 18 points for slower power hitter. This is suddenly a 40 Point OPSsc differential versus the standard, power hitting favored OPS stat.

And we have not even valued in if there is a difference when a fast runner is on first base versus a slower runner.

**Omar Vizquel, aka the Sultan of Sacrifice, is the Modern Era leader in Combo sac hits and sac flies with 350,** and he only struck out about 60 times a year, meaning anywhere from 25 to 80 extra non strike out contact at bat outs versus the conventional power hitter. Add in Vizquel's ability to move runners over even with a ground out probably means Omar's .688 OPS is closer to a .720 to .725 OPSsc range, while the vaunted power hitter drops 18 OPSsc points closer to Vizquel because of GIDP's. __Omar Vizquel may have been one of the best Productive Outs hitters the Modern Era has ever seen,__ so if the average fast contact hitter added 22.5 points to their OPS, Omar Viquel could easily be at 30 to 40 points.

**Too many Baseball Hall of Fame voters who never saw Omar Vizquel hit are being overly influenced by a non representative, significantly inaccurate OPS statistic. **Instead of comparing a .688 OPS versus an .800 OPS, we could be comparing a .725 OPSsc versus a .782 OPSsc. While still a noticeable difference, 11 Gold Gloves for Omar Viquel would suddenly make for a convincing case for the Baseball Hall of Fame when combined with a .725 OPSsc. Otherwise, Omar Vizquel could have had a .300 batting average under the present OPS system to reach a .725 OPS. A .300 batting average would have ensured Omar Vizquel a Hall of Fame spot, but a .300 batting average may be only marginally better statistically than a .272 batting average if the .272 batter has mastered making productive outs with minimal strike outs, as Omar Vizquel most definitely did.

Closing the overall power biased OPS gap by use of a Productive Out OPSsc stat is the right thing to do because it more accurately and fairly represents the overall OPS value between the speed contact hitter and power hitter.